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Why do some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others are fought to the finish? Numerous competing theories address this question. Yet not until now has a study combined the historical sweep, empirical richness, and conceptual rigor necessary to put them thoroughly to the test and draw lessons invaluable to students, scholars, and policymakers. Using data on every civil war fought between 1940 and 1992, Barbara Walter details the conditions that lead combatants to partake in what she defines as a three-step process--the decision on whether to initiate negotiations, to compromise, and, finally, to implement any resulting terms. Her key finding: rarely are such conflicts resolved without active third-party intervention.Walter argues that for negotiations to succeed it is not enough for the opposing sides to resolve the underlying issues behind a civil war. Instead the combatants must clear the much higher hurdle of designing credible guarantees on the terms of agreement--something that is difficult without outside assistance. Examining conflicts from Greece to Laos, China to Columbia, Bosnia to Rwanda, Walter confirms just how crucial the prospect of third-party security guarantees and effective power-sharing pacts can be--and that adversaries do, in fact, consider such factors in deciding whether to negotiate or fight. While taking many other variables into account and acknowledging that third parties must also weigh the costs and benefits of involvement in civil war resolution, this study reveals not only how peace is possible, but probable...
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 1-27
ISSN: 1547-7444
Why do multiple rebel groups form in some civil wars but not others? Since 1946, only half of all civil wars were fought by a single rebel group; the rest were fought by multiple groups. This article argues that this variation is determined by the incentives political entrepreneurs have to enter a war. The higher the demand for political change and the lower the costs of fighting, the more incentives entrepreneurs have to form their own group. Analyzing UCDP data for all civil wars between 1946 and 2015 I find that the two measures of demand – the number of identifiable ethnic or religious groups in a country and the size of the disgruntled population – have the most consistent effects, but that key measures of costs such as the size of the government military also matter. A detailed analysis of the Ethiopian case further reveals the influence of external intervention on the formation of rebel groups. These results suggest that rebel groups emerge in civil wars in rational, predictable ways related to the ease by which rebel elites can mobilize separate groups for fighting.
World Affairs Online
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 1-27
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: International security, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 7-39
ISSN: 1531-4804
The number of radical Islamist groups fighting in civil wars in Muslim countries has steadily grown over the last twenty years, with such groups outlasting and outperforming more moderate groups. By 2016, Salafi jihadist groups accounted for most of the militant groups in Syria and half of such groups in Somalia. In Iraq, a third of all militant groups were composed of Salafi jihadists. Many analysts argue that the rise of these groups reflects an increase in radical beliefs in Muslim societies. Under certain conditions, however, rebel leaders have strong incentives to embrace an extreme ideology even if they do not believe the ideas that underlie it. When competition is high, information is poor, and institutional constraints are weak, an extremist ideology can help rebel leaders overcome difficult collective-action, principal-agent, and commitment problems. All three of these conditions have been present in the post-2003 civil wars in the Middle East and Africa, and all help explain the emergence and growth of radical groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaida.
In: Annual review of political science, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 469-486
ISSN: 1545-1577
Post-2003 civil wars are different from previous civil wars in three striking ways. First, most of them are situated in Muslim-majority countries. Second, most of the rebel groups fighting these wars espouse radical Islamist ideas and goals. Third, most of these radical groups are pursuing transnational rather than national aims. Current civil war theories can explain some of what is going on, but not everything. In this article, I argue that the transformation of information technology, especially the advent of the Web 2.0 in the early 2000s, is the big new innovation that is likely driving many of these changes. I offer a theory to explain why rebel groups, especially those in Muslim countries, have chosen to pursue a particular type of extreme ideology and goals. I then identify the six big implications this new information environment is likely to have for rebel behavior in the future. Innovations in information and communication technology are currently manifesting themselves in the rise of global Jihadi groups in the Muslim world, but we can expect them to be exploited by other groups as well.
In: International security, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 7-39
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: Annual Review of Political Science, Band 20, S. 469-486
SSRN
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 59, Heft 7, S. 1242-1272
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 59, Heft 7, S. 1242-1272
ISSN: 1552-8766
Most contemporary civil wars are now recurrences of earlier civil wars. In contrast to classic theories of grievance and opportunity, this article advances a theory of civil war recurrence that highlights the critical role political and legal institutions play in constraining elites in post–civil war states. Such constraints serve as a check on executive power, help incumbent elites credibly commit to political reform, and create a situation where rebels need not maintain militias as a supplementary mechanism to hold political elites in line. All of this reduces the odds of repeat civil war. Using a statistical analysis of post-conflict years, this article demonstrates that strong political institutions are not only significantly and negatively related to repeat civil war but are the primary determinants of whether countries get caught in the conflict trap.
In: Revue française de science politique, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 841-841
ISSN: 0035-2950
In: Annual review of political science, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 243-261
ISSN: 1545-1577
This article explores the many bargaining failures that may occur at every stage in intrastate disputes: before fighting breaks out, as a war is being fought, and once a war ends. It argues that disputes that occur within states are particularly susceptible to information and commitment problems. It also reveals why certain countries have more difficulty overcoming these problems than others do. This represents the most comprehensive overview to date of bargaining failures associated with civil wars.
In: Annual review of political science, Band 12, S. 243-262
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: Annual review of political science, Band 12
ISSN: 1545-1577
This article explores the many bargaining failures that may occur at every stage in intrastate disputes: before fighting breaks out, as a war is being fought, & once a war ends. It argues that disputes that occur within states are particularly susceptible to information & commitment problems. It also reveals why certain countries have more difficulty overcoming these problems than others do. This represents the most comprehensive overview to date of bargaining failures associated with civil wars. Adapted from the source document.